This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing, that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi-homing is prevalent.
I. Introduction
This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in network industries when consumers can engage in multi-homing, that is, consumers can participate in multiple platforms (or purchase multiple products) in order to reap maximal network benefits. The paper is partly motivated by the recent antitrust cases concerning Microsoft. In the European case, for instance, it has been alleged that the company's tying practice of requiring Windows operating system users to accept its Windows Media Player software is anti-competitive and hurts digital media rivals such as RealNetworks. 1 However, multi-homing is common in digital media systems. Many users have more than one media player and many content providers offer content in more than one format, which counteracts the tendency towards tipping and the lock-in effects in industries with network effects.
To analyze the effects of tying in markets such as digital media, I adopt the framework of platform competition in two-sided markets. The defining characteristic of two-sided markets is indirect network effects or inter-group network externalities that arise through improved opportunities to trade with the other side of the market. In the digital media case, content providers and final consumers constitute the two sides that trade with each other. For instance, as more content is available in streaming media the more valuable media player programs become, and vice versa. Other prominent examples of economic importance include auction sites such as eBay and Yahoo where buyers and sellers get together to consummate a deal, credit card payment systems such as Visa and MasterCard where both merchants and consumers need to participate in the same system, video game platforms such as PlayStation, X-box and GameCube where game developers and consumers constitute the two distinct sides, etc. 2 In such markets, the need to get all sides of the market to get on board creates a so-called "chicken and egg" problem (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) in that members of each group are willing to participate in the market only if they expect many members from the other side to participate. The literature on multi-sided markets is mainly concerned with the optimal pricing structure to coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers who need each other in some way. 3
More recently, the importance of studying antitrust issues in two-sided markets has been recognized by several authors. Evans (2003) and Wright (2003) , for instance, provide a general discussion on antitrust policy in two-sided markets and call for caution in applying the traditional one-sided logic to two-sided markets in the antitrust arena. However, their discussion is mainly informal and does not deal with tying arrangements. Rochet and Tirole (2003b) is a notable exception in the analysis of tying in two-sided markets. They provide an economic analysis of the tying practice initiated by payments card associations Visa and MasterCard in which merchants who accept their credit cards were forced also to accept their debit cards. 4 They show that in the absence of tying, the interchange fee between the merchant's and the cardholder's banks on debit is too low and tends to be too high on credit compared to the social optimum. Tying is shown to be a mechanism to rebalance the interchange fee structure and raise social welfare. Their model, however, is tailored to analyze the payment card industry and the recent antitrust suit involving Visa and MasterCard. In particular, the analysis focuses on tying by a non-profit association to reflect the status of credit card associations.
I show that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platformspecific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. As a result, tying can be welfare-enhancing if multi-homing is allowed, even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi-homing. The analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases and suggests caution in applying the traditional theory of network effects and tipping to markets where multihoming is prevalent. This paper is also closely related to the literature on the "leverage theory" of tying.
According to the "leverage theory" of tying, a two-product firm with monopoly power in one market can monopolize a second market using the leverage provided by its monopoly power in the first market. Whinston (1990) , for instance, shows that if the market structure in the tied good market is oligopolistic and scale economies are present, tying can be an effective and profitable strategy to alter market structure by making continued operation unprofitable for tied good rivals. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in Whinston's basic model inducing the exit of the rival firm is essential for the profitability of agreed to drop its "honor all cards" policy, which will allow retailers to accept its credit cards without also accepting debit cards.
30/09/06tying arrangements. 5 Thus, if the competitor has already paid the sunk cost of entry and there is no avoidable fixed cost, tying cannot be a profitable strategy. 6 Choi and Stefanadis (2001) extend the analysis by investigating implications of tying for innovation incentives.
They show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in systems markets consisting of complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. 7 Carlton & Waldman [2002] are especially worth mentioning in relation to this paper.
They investigate how the tying of complementary products can be used to preserve and create monopoly positions. Their analysis focuses on two mechanisms through which tying can be used in an anticompetitive way: entry costs and network externalities. In particular, their model with network externalities shows that the presence of network externalities for the complementary good can result in the strategic use of tying to deter entry into the primary market. The nature of network effects in their paper, however, is direct and thus does not explicitly accounts for the peculiarities of two-sided markets. In addition, none of these papers in the tying literature, however, take into consideration the possibility of multihoming seriously in the analysis. Carlton and Waldman (2002) , for instance, assume that "if a consumer purchases a tied good consisting of one unit of the monopolist's primary good and one unit of its complementary good, then the consumer cannot add a unit of the 5 Whinston (1990) points out that if the heterogeneity of consumer preferences are allowed for the tying good, tying can also serve as a price discriminating device and exclusion of the rival firm is not necessary for the profitability of tying. See also Carbajo et al. (1990) . 6 Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidman (1990) and Chen (1997) provide an alternative theory of strategic bundling in which bundling plays the role of a product-differentiation device. As in this paper, bundling does not require the exit of the rival firm to be profitable. However, bundling is used to segment the market and relax competition. 7 In related papers, Choi (1996 Choi ( , 2004 demonstrates that even in the absence of exit by the rival firm, bundling can be a profitable strategy via its long-term effects on competition through innovation.
30/09/06alternative producer's complementary good to the system (italics added, p. 199)." In other words, either they do not allow the possibility of multi-homing or multi-homing does not arise in equilibrium. Doganoglu and Wright (2006a) 
II. The Basic Model of Two-Sided Markets
In this section, I lay out a very simple model of two-sided markets and derive the market outcome in the absence of tying and multi-homing. The model is a modification of the framework developed by Armstrong (forthcoming) and Rochet and Tirole (2003a) . The analysis in this section will be used as a benchmark to investigate the effects of tying in two-30/09/06sided platform markets in section III. In section IV, I will modify the model to account for the possibility of multi-homing.
The model consists of three classes of agents. There are two distinct types of customer groups who interact with each other and intermediaries who provide platforms to enable these two customer groups to "meet" each other. In the example of streaming multimedia players, the two customer groups can be described as content providers and consumers who download content through the Internet. There are currently three major platform providers: Real Networks, Microsoft and Apple.
In my model, these software/platform providers can be considered as the intermediaries who compete in twosided platform businesses.
Let me assume that there are two intermediaries indexed by i =A, B. and consumers who participate in platform i are denoted by m i and n i , respectively. As in Armstrong (forthcoming), I consider a situation in which at least one side of the market is characterized by exclusive intermediation. More specifically, I assume that final consumers "single-home," that is, they participate in only one platform.
II.1. Content Providers
I assume that there is free entry in the market for content provision. Content providers are heterogeneous in their fixed cost of creating content, which is denoted as θ.
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The content providers incur this cost twice if they multi-home, i.e., make their content available in digital form on both platforms. I normalize the number of potential content providers to 1 and let F(θ) be the distribution function for θ.
Each content provider gains additional utility (profit) of π from each consumer who has access to her content. The profit for content providers who create content on platform i is given by π n i − p i − θ when her fixed cost of creating content is θ and the number of final consumers who participate in platform i is n i . A type-θ content provider is willing to create content for platform i if θ < π n i − p i Thus, the number of content providers on platform i is given by:
This implies that the larger the number of consumers participating in platform i is, the greater the amount of content that will be provided on that platform.
II.2. Consumers
To analyze the consumers' choice of platform, I adopt the Hotelling model of product differentiation. I assume that two platforms, A and B, are located at the two extreme points of a line with length equal to 1. Consumers, whose size is normalized to 1, are uniformly distributed along the line. Each consumer's utility of participating in a platform depends on the number of content providers on the same platform. More specifically, the availability of each additional content provider generates additional utility of b. Consumers are also allowed to multi-home, but it will be shown later that they will are, respectively, given by:
II.3. Platform Competition without Tying
Platforms compete in prices to attract consumers in both sides of the market. Each intermediary i's objective function is given by:
where m A and n A are jointly determined by equations (1) 
The first order condition with respect to p i yields:
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The (symmetric) equilibrium price for content providers is thus given by
where
can be considered as a measure of the price elasticity of content supply.
In deriving the symmetric equilibrium price for final consumers, q A = q B = q*, I first note a one-to-one relationship between q i and n i from equation (2), given the rival intermediary's price for final consumers q j , where i = A, B, and j ≠ i.
It turns out to be more convenient to treat n i as a control variable for intermediary i in the consumer side of the market.
The first order condition with respect to n i yields:
At the symmetric equilibrium, the first order condition (9) is satisfied at n i = 1/2. This implies that the symmetric equilibrium price q A = q B = q* can be characterized as:
Using equation (6), the symmetric equilibrium price q* can be written as
which can be interpreted as the standard Hotelling price (d + t) adjusted by two terms representing inter-group network externalities in the two-sided markets. The first term (πF)
represents direct inter-group externalities that an additional consumer bestows on content providers. The second term ( 1 2 bπF′) represents the indirect inter-group externalities that an additional consumer gives to other existing consumers through the feedback process through which additional content is provided.
II.4. Socially Optimal Outcome
In this subsection, I conduct a welfare analysis in which I derive the socially optimal outcome and compare it with the market equilibrium. Under the Hotelling model with the assumption of a covered market on the consumer side, social welfare depends only on the price for content providers (p i ) that affects the amount of content provided in the market.
With the symmetric outcome, social welfare as a function of the price for content providers (p 1 = p 2 = p) can be written as:
The first order condition with respect to p yields the following socially optimal price for content providers:
The socially optimal outcome thus requires below cost pricing for content providers to take into account of their positive externalities to consumers.
III. An Analysis of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Single-Homing Consumers
To analyze the effects of tying on competition in two-sided markets, I assume that intermediary A is also a monopolist in a related market called M with unit production cost of 
III.1. No Tying
If the two products are not bundled, let me assume that consumers buy product M prior to participating in the two-sided market since M is essential for the latter activity. Due 8 Firm 1 may have a patent or have an installed base that makes entry unprofitable in the presence of switching costs or network externalities (Farrell and Klemperer, 2001) .
to the essentialness of product M, the monopolist can extract consumer surplus from participating in the two-sided market. Let u *= b m*− q* (gross of transportation costs) be the equilibrium utility offered in the two-sided market. Assume further that (v − c M ) is sufficiently large that it is in best interest of firm M to cover the market. The consumer who has the lowest surplus is the one located in the middle of the line whose surplus is given by u *− 2 t . The monopolist will charge the price of v + u *− 2 t . In the two-sided market I am interested in, the analysis in the previous section applies.
III.2. Tying
Suppose that the monopolist bundles the two products and charges a price of % A q for the bundled product on the consumer side. 9 I assume that v (> c M ) is sufficiently large that firm A will price the bundled good so that every final consumer purchases it. With n A = 1, the number of content providers on platform A then is given by F(π −°A p ) when the tying firm charges content providers °A p . This implies that the bundled good price is set at the price such that the final consumer located at x =1 gets zero surplus:
The tying firm's profit maximization problem can be written as:
9 Variables corresponding to tying are denoted with a tilde.
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The first order condition with respect to °A p is given by
Thus, the equilibrium bundle price for final consumers ( % A q *) and the price for content providers under tying (°A p *) are characterized as:
III.3. Welfare Analysis
In this subsection, I compare the market outcomes under tying and no tying and provide a welfare analysis. There are three channels through which tying can affect social welfare due to the monopolization of both sides of the market. First, all consumers patronize the tying firm's platform. This implies that there is less variety in the market. As a result, there are less desirable matches between the consumers and platforms, leading to higher overall "transportation costs." Second, content is provided only on the tying firm's platform, whereas the same content was produced on both platforms in the absence of tying.
Thus, there are savings in duplication costs under tying. Third, the number of entrants in the content side of the market that determines the availability of content can differ across regimes. The first effect is negative while the second effect is positive. The sign of the third effect is ambiguous. The coordination of consumers on the tying firm's platform enhances the incentive to enter the content side of the market. However, the tying firm's pricing decision in that side of the market can offset this positive effect.
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To conduct a more explicit welfare analysis, I will analyze the effect of tying assuming that θ is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. With the uniform distribution, it can easily be verified from equations (6) and (18) Thus, the social welfare change due to tying can be written as: 
The result thus suggests that the welfare implications of tying depend on the relative magnitude of inter-group externalities (π and b) and the extent of product differentiation. If 30/09/06the extent of inter-group externalities (π and b) is significant compared to that of product differentiation (t), tying can be welfare-enhancing since the benefit from internalizing the inter-group network externalities outweighs the loss of product variety. Otherwise, tying reduces welfare.
IV. Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Both Sides Multi-Homing
The analysis above considers situations in which the consumer side of the market is characterized by exclusive intermediation. However, this assumption is at odds with the prevailing condition in many two-sided markets such as the digital media and the payment card industries. In the digital media case, many users have more than one media player and many content providers offer content in more than one format. The payment card portrays a similar picture with consumers carrying more than one payment card and merchants accepting multiple payment cards. In this section, I modify the basic model to explicitly analyze the possibility of multi-homing on both sides.
IV.1. Content Providers
In the previous sections, I assumed that there is free entry in the market for content provision and did not make a distinction on whether content available across platforms is the same or different. With the assumption of single-homing by consumers, all that matters for consumers is the amount of content available for each platform. However, once multihoming is allowed on the consumer side, it makes a difference; in the symmetric equilibrium with the same amount of content available for each platform, consumers would not have any incentive to multi-home and the equilibrium identified in section II continues 30/09/06to be an equilibrium even if multi-homing is allowed on the consumer side as long as the same content (not just the same amount) is provided across the platforms. However, if the content is different across the platforms, the previous equilibrium may not survive with the possibility of multi-homing on the consumer side.
In order to make the possibility of multi-homing on the consumer side play a role, assume that there are two types of content available. One type of content is more suitable for one of the two platforms (formats) whereas the other type of content is suitable for both formats. To simplify the analysis, let me assume that when content is of the first type, that is, it is more suitable for one of the two formats, it is not economically feasible to encode in the other format. More specifically, the total measure of content potentially available for each format is normalized to 1. Among them, the proportion λ is of the first type and thus can be encoded only for a particular format whereas (1−λ) can also be encoded in the other format. The existence of exclusive content available for each format creates incentive for consumers to multi-home. When the second type of content is encoded for both formats, content providers are said to multi-home.
IV.2. Consumers
The consumer side of the market is the same as in the previous sections. The only modification is that consumers are now allowed to multi-home. As a result, there are three choices for consumers, assuming that the market is covered as before. Consumers can choose to either single-home or multi-home. If they decide to single-home, they choose one of the two platforms in which to participate in. The location of the consumer who is indifferent between single-homing A and multi-homing is given by:
IV.3. Market Equilibrium in the Two
Similarly, the location of the consumer who is indifferent between single-homing B and multi-homing is given by:
This implies that the number of consumers who single-home platform i is as follows (see 
The number of consumers who multi-home is given by
Let A N and denote the total number of consumers who participate in platform A and B, respectively. Then, we have . Thus, the optimal price for platform A on the content provider side depends on q B under the configuration I consider, and is given by
This implies that under the configuration in which both consumers and content providers multi-home, each platform's optimal price for each side is independent of the other.
On the consumer side, platform A solves the following problem:
Thus, the optimal price on the consumer side is given by
The optimal I assume that both A1 and A2 hold in the remainder of the paper.
IV.2. Tying
As in the previous section, I assume that v (> c M ) is sufficiently large that firm A will price the bundled good so that every final consumer purchases it. Given that every 
The first order condition for the above problem yields
The number of consumers who participate in platform B and thus multi-home is given by
IV.3. Welfare Analysis
To explore the welfare implications of tying, I note that welfare under no tying and tying can be written as: Thus, the social welfare change due to tying can be written as:
λ π − + + > 0 by assumption A2, which implies that tying induces more consumers to multi-home and makes platform-specific exclusive content available to more consumers, which is also beneficial to content providers. The first term in equation (33) Nonetheless, the simple structure of the model yields an unambiguous answer concerning the welfare effects of tying. To see this, I manipulate equation (33) as
The first-term in equation (34) is still positive by assumption A1. In addition, the expression in the curly bracket is negative since
Therefore, ∆W = °W − W > 0, that is, tying is welfare-enhancing in this simple model.
To explore the role of multi-homing in the model, it is instructive to consider the welfare effects of tying in a situation where tying prevents consumers from multi-homing. 11
Without multi-homing, all consumers will use only the tied product in the two-sided market.
This implies that all content is provided for format A and exclusive content for format B will be no longer available. The welfare level under tying in the absence of multi-homing is given by 
V. Concluding Remarks
I analyze the effects of tying arrangements on competition in markets with indirect network effects by using the framework of two-sided markets. In particular, I develop a model of network competition that explicitly incorporates the possibility of multi-homing. I consider two possible cases, one in which only the content side is allowed to multi-home with the consumer side of the market being characterized by exclusive intermediation, and the other in which both content providers and final consumers are allowed to participate in both platforms.
My analysis is motivated by the prevailing condition in the digital media market in which content providers encode in multiple formats and consumers use multiple media players. Multi-homing has potential to counteract the tendency towards tipping and the 30/09/06lock-in effects in industries with network effects. As a result, tying does not automatically foreclose competing products. Even in cases where tying leads to the foreclosure of competing products as in the model with exclusive intermediation on the consumer side, the welfare implications of tying can be subtle and ambiguous. Therefore, we need be cautious in applying the traditional theory of network effects and tipping to two-sided markets. I conclude by mentioning a couple of avenues along which the current analysis can be extended.
First of all, I have assumed that there is an exogenous amount of exclusive content available for each format. This can be justified if the two platforms are technically differentiated and some content is more appropriate for one particular type of technology.
However, exclusivity can be endogenously created through the use of exclusive contracts.
A recent paper by Doganoglu and Wright (2006b) analyzes the ability of an incumbent to use exclusive contracts to deter entry by a more efficient entrant in a market characterized by network effects. They find that exclusive contracts can be anticompetitive if consumers can join only a single firm. With the possibility of multi-homing, however, they find that contracts that only require consumers to commit to purchase from the incumbent is not anticompetitive unless they prevent consumers from also buying from the entrant. In my model, an interesting question would be if exclusive contracts can be used by non-tying firms to create incentives for consumers to multi-home when the monopolist ties.
In addition, many network industries are in dynamic and technology-driven high- 
